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"THE SOCIOLOGY OF A REFUGEE
CENTRE;
Some Notes on Law, Relativism and
Interdisciplinary Communication"
JANIS DEMCHUK RUNGE*
What is the matter with Mary Jane?
She's crying with all her might and main,
And she won't eat her dinner- rice pudding again-

What is the matter with Mary Jane?

What is the matter with Mary Jane?
I've promised her dolls and a daisy-chain,
And a book about animals- all in vain-

What is the matter with Mary Jane?
What is the matter with Mary Jane?

She's perfectly well, and she hasn't a pain;
But, look at her, now she's beginning again!What is the matter with Mary Jane?

What is the matter with Mary Jane?
I've promised her sweets and a ride in the train,
And I've begged her to stop for a bit and explain! -

What is the matter with Mary Jane?

What is the matter with Mary Jane?
She's perfectly well and she hasn't a pain,
And it's lovely rice pudding for dinner again! What is the matter with with Mary Jane?'

A. A. Milne was an artist. It was perfectly legitimate for him to know that
he didn't understand. Rice pudding wasn't good enough. Nor were dolls
and daisy-chains. But what about us? How easy is it for an intellectual, a
trained and liberally educated professional to admit that his knowledge and
his skills haven't made the world a better place to live in, and haven't even
provided a way of understanding and interpreting what is happening around
him? Is it easier to do that if we think of intellectual and political critics as
Mary Janes who fail to see the value of rice pudding again? What is knowledge for, after all? Is it true, or realistic, as Ortega Y Gasset claims, that the
"mission" of the university, the justification for the protection of an intellectual community of scholars is in that community's responsibility to transmit
the "ideas of an age"?, ideas that will allow students and intellectuals to
interpret the world and their experiences within it in a meaningful, dignified
way, to "live a life which is something above meaningless tragedy or inward
disgrace"? 2 Are the universities doing that?
*Graduate Student of Sociology at the University of Toronto.
'A. A. Milne, "Rice Pudding" in When We Were Young (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1925) 48-51.
2lose Ortega Y Gasset, Mission of the University (New York: W. W. Norton
and Co. Inc., 1944) 43.
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Some say not.
Social theorists today work within a crumbling social matrix of paralyzed urban
centres and battered campuses. Some put cotton in their ears, but their bodies
still feel the shock waves. It is no exaggeration to say that we theorize today
within the sound of
3 guns. The old order has the picks of a hundred rebellions
thrust into its hide.

How many people know that? Believe it? Is it possible to know that, believe
it, and at the same time, carry out the role of a professional, a citizen, a
scientist, a scholar, a student? Alvin Gouldner recently published a book
called, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. He thought it was necessary
to know that and to carry out the role of the intellectual at the same time.
His first sentence is:
at our peril
The criticism and transformation of society can be divorced only
4
from the criticism and transformation of theories about society.

Theories, of course, have their locus in empirical reality. (Just like rice
pudding). But empirical reality is rather a large place and one that looks
different everytime a new group of malcontents take it upon themselves to
describe it. How can that be? Is it because they are silly? Power hungry?
Crazy? Wrong? Revolutionaries? Is it because they don't understand how
questions of value can be separated from questions of fact? Is it defensible
to turn down rice pudding, dolls and daisies?
There is no reason why one should be required to evaluate the formula for a

new poison gas solely in terms of its mathematical elegance or of other pgrely
technical criteria. And there is little point in pretending that such a formula is
a purely neutral bit of information, useful for the furtherance of any and all social
values; the thing is meant to kill and, precisely because it is technically adequate,
it does so. To limit judgment solely to "autonomous" technical criteria is in effect
not only to allow but to require men to be moral cretins in their technical roles.
It is to make psychopathic behavior culturally required to the conduct of
scientific roles. Insofar as our culture conventionally construes technical, scientific
and professional roles as those that obligate men to ignore all but the technical
implications of their work, the very social structure is itself inherently pathostructure is akin to that of
genic. The social function of such a segmented role
the reflexive obedience induced by military training.5

But, just as Gouldner says, it is the "social structure itself that is inherently
pathogenic".0 We are back full circle. Nobody is responsible except in some
vague collective conscience sense that allows things to continue as they are.
What about justice?
Substantial numbers of citizens are dissatisfied with the entire apparatus of the
law. In recent years commentators have begun to make the connection between
the dissatisfaction and the failure of the legal profession to
7 make recourse to the
law possible for the poor and much of the middle class.
The current call for a legal profession and a legal education dedicated to such
values as the public interest and social
8 justice raise in a dramatic way well known

themes in our professional history.
Few would argue that the level of political and moral consciousness is acute
in our age. Some would argue that it is fanatical. Dangerous. But how does it
RId.

4 Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology (New York: Basic

Books, 1970) vii [hereinafter Gouldneri.
51d. at 1.

DId. at 13.
7
Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism (1970), 79 Yale L., at 1179.
8 Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education (1970), 79 Yale L. J. at 1153.
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get translated into action? Through what channels? How widespread is it, and
what forms does it take? Is there some way to locate its direction, its locus
of responsibility?
GeneralStatement of the Thesis
This paper shall explore the general thesis that interdisciplinary communication is a utopian movement towards a change in the form in which
knowledge is institutionalized. We argue that the contemporary intellectuals'
perceptions of larger structural changes in society have generated an interest
in Phenomenology as a dominant "philosophic idea". 9 For our purposes, the
most important feature of phenomenology is its celebration of the recognition
that reality is always socially reconstructed, 10 or "man-made". When an effort
is made to explore the implications of this particular view of reality - and
we submit that interdisciplinary communication involves such an effort relativism as a dominant meta-principle is generally employed to direct that
effort.
Karl Mannheim defines relativism as a "product of the modern historical-sociological procedure which is based on the recognition that all historical
thinking is bound up with the concrete position in life of the thinker"." And
he argues that ".... relativism, then owes its existence to the discrepancy
between this newly won insight (the relationship between thinker and object
of thought) into the actual processes of thought and a2 theory of knowledge
which had not yet taken account of this new insight."'
We argue then, that the utopian goal of interdisciplinary communication
is to structure a view of reality which takes into account the important
insight at the root of phenomenology; that is, that the world ".... as "world"
exists only with reference to the knowing mind, and the mental activity of
the subject determines the form in which the world appears." 3 Relativism,
then, is an essential ingredient of both the utopian vision and the ideological
weapon, or means of achieving that vision.
To define the movement towards interdisciplinary communication as a
utopian movement for change brings into relief two important characteristics
of that movement: firstly, a dissatisfaction with the structure of the presently
existing bodies of knowledge; and secondly, a vague, abstract, and unarticulated idea of what should be the structure of a given discipline.
There is an ironic paradox inherent in this movement
sense of dissatisfaction with the existing structure of bodies of
their ability to deal with the emerging real and intellectual
rapidly changing environment have generated an interest in,
with phenomenology or relativism. Relativism then becomes
9

for change. A
knowledge and
problems of a
and an affinity
the ideological

Lewis Feuer, The Sociology of Philosophic Ideas (1958), 1 Pacific Sociological

Review 77-80.

10Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality

(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967).
11 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1936) 78 at 79 [hereinafter Ideology].
12 Id. at 78.
18 Id. at 66.
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weapon in the attack upon the ability of disciplines to confront problems perceived to be crucial. To understand and document how extensively existing
ideas and perceptions of reality have been coloured by socio-economic and
historical conditions under which these ideas were developed, it is necessary
to employ a relativistic stance. However, in so doing one is obviously subject
to the same criticism; that is, that phenomenology or relativism is itself a
particular, historically-conditioned intellectual posture.
For this reason, we argue that it is necessary to see the interdisciplinary
communication movement as essentially a response to the perception of
larger structural changes which demand the development of a new mode of
inquiry in order to deal adequately with emerging problems. Throughout
these notes, we shall bring together evidence to suggest that the movement
can be best characterized as essentially transient - that it is, in fact, an
intermediary stage which tries to develop new modes of inquiry to solve new
problems. We submit that the movement is necessarily introspective, selfcritical, and characterized by conflicts between competing redefinitions of
ways of perceiving reality and ways of structuring knowledge.
This argument is contingent upon a particular theory of knowledge
which stresses the degree to which knowledge is "man-made", and on a
definition of the intellectual as someone whose "business" it is to interpret
reality, either for the purpose of developing a body of knowledge which does
that, or in order consciously to direct the course of action in society. Lewis
Feuer defines the contemporary intellectual as someone "... whose con-

sciousness determines his existence, who does not suffer the world passively,
but seeks a mode1 4of existence more in accord with his philosophy, his ideas,
and his feelings."
We begin with the assumption that, by directing a discussion of communication between law and sociology within the broader perspective of interdisciplinary communication as an analytically distinct "problem", we can gain
new insights into the specific problems involved in the communication and
collaboration between law and sociology. That is, we are methodologically
employing the idea that by stepping outside the specific problem, and viewing
that problem from a more abstract level of generality, we will gain new
insights into the specific problem.
Rather than adding one more updated review of the literature, we
assume a certain familiarity with the existence of the general movement
towards interdisciplinary communication and the more specific literature
that deals with law and the social sciences.' 5 We would emphasise that, for
14 Lewis

Feuer, The Scientific Intellectual (New York: Basic Books, 1963) Pre-

face ix.
15 orinstance, articles and notes in recent law journals: (1970), 8 O.H.LJ. 345;
almost any number of the Law and Society Review; Schur, Law & Society (New York:
Random House, 1968); W. Freedman, Law in a Changing Society (Berkley: University

of California Press, 1959); A. Ragann ed., Politics, Personality and the Social Sciences
In the 20th Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); J. Stone, Law and
the Social Sciences in the Second Half of the 20th Century (Minneapolis: University of
Minneapolis Press, 1966); J.Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1963); W. Evan ed., Law and Sociology (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) [hereinafter Law and Sociology].

1971]

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

some purposes, the distinctions (between law and psychiatry, or law and
anthropology, for instance) should be maintained. However, we would
maintain the additional importance of seeing these specialized cases as part
of a larger movement which includes a concern with legal education in a
general way.
INTRODUCTION
It is an astonishing fact of American intellectual life that both law and social

science have been able to expand so enormously in the present century without
significantly affecting each other.'0

Executive action, legislation, and even judicial administration invades almost
every sector of human activity without benefit of social science; and the social
disciplines range
over vast areas of human behavior largely ignoring the fact of
legal control.' 7

Contemporary society has been variously described as one of political,
social, and cultural unrest; of technological and educational revolutions, of
information explosions, and of mass reform movements. It seems not unnatural, then, that efforts are being made to bring together various bodies of
knowledge to describe, explain, interpret and solve the problems perceived to
have emerged from such conditions. However, the perception of the difficulties involved in active collaboration between various "bodies of knowledge"
has granted increasing recognition to yet another problem - the problem of
interdisciplinary communication. What would seem to be a simple enough
solution, i.e. bringing specialized expertise from a variety of sources to bear
on intellectual issues, has become problematic in itself.
Undoubtedly, the literature on the communication between law and
sociology could be seen as not only voluminous, but as distinctively selfconscious in a way that is offensive to some. To others, the offensiveness lies
in the "home-grown" solutions that are either too specific, or too utopian to
be of service. Although there is no doubt that interdisciplinary collaboration
has become fashionable, few scholars and fewer practicing professionals see
interdisciplinary communication as a distinctive intellectual problem to be
pursued in its own right. There seems to exist an inherent reluctance to concede that for rational, educated adults to collaborate on an area of mutual
interest would constitute a problem. Those few academicians who do isolate
interdisciplinary collaboration as a special area of interest (that is, those who
conceptualize it as an "intellectual problem") fall into one of two general
categories; first, those whose inquiry is directed at an epistemological, or
quasi-psychological level of analysis and who are interested in creativity and
discovery,' 8 and second, those whose inquiry is directed towards a historical
and/or sociological analysis of the development and diffusion of ideas and
ideologies in specific historical periods. 19 Rarely, however, do those scholars
16 Thomas Cowan, What Law Can Do for Social Sciences in William Evan (ed.),

Law and Sociology (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) 91.
17 Id.

18W. Gordon, Synectics (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1961). See especially
the bibliography.
19 To note just a few examples, the works of Lewis Feuer, Karl Mannheim, and,
generally, those who follow the European tradition of the sociology of knowledge;

also more recent works, e.g., R. Bendix, Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge

(1971); Gouldner, supra note 4.
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who are actively involved in cross-disciplinary communication attempt, at
the same time, to develop a theoretical understanding of their failures and
successes. To do so would be to develop a theory of cross-disciplinary communication and that theory would imply a radical reorientation of the way in
which we view rational, objective bodies of knowledge.
Inter-disciplinary communication, then remains a rather loose, multipotential category that refers to a desire to gain access to information outside
one's discipline. Courses are given which attempt to make use of interdisciplinary approaches; experts are traded by university departments through the
cross-appointment system; conferences are held; and renaissance men and
generalists are celebrated.
In many departments of many universities there persists a fringe group
of adherents to the belief that information should be made available from
other disciplines to supplement the traditional body of knowledge of that
department. Efforts are made to show that information from other disciplines
allows one to develop a more profound understanding and a broader perspective. The view is expounded that information from other disciplines, in fact,
alters the character of the dominant orientation and allows each discipline
to deal more realistically with the problems confronted by its discrete area
of specialization. Phenomenology as a basic philosophic idea is put forward
as an important reminder that reality is socially reconstructed and that our
knowledge of reality is coloured by the perspective from which we view it.
An immediate corollary is that disciplines themselves create particular "world
views", or ways of perceiving reality" and perpetuate a trained incapacity to
absorb new information. Information from other disciplines then, is seen as
a revitalizing force.

The Development of the Refugee Centre
Although all this seems simple and agreeable enough, efforts at collabo-

ration often fail, and attempts to bring in new information from other disciplines are often disappointing and frustrating. Departments tend to polarize
in terms of those who continue to support interdisciplinary efforts and those
who fail to see any real value or any real possibility in these efforts. The
result is often a weakening, or even a breakdown, in intra-disciplinary communication. When this occurs in individual departments, or in disciplines
generally, interdisciplinary communication tends to become a refugee centre,
and, by that token, both a problem and a solution. Refugee centres are
characteristically transient stopping-off points; moving on indicates some
degree of success. This seems to be true of interdisciplinary movements as

well.
It is to this level of analysis, that is, interdisciplinary communication as
a phenomena in and of itself, that we will direct our inquiry. We are using
the growing interest in interdisciplinary communication as data which reflect
important intellectual responses to changes in modem society. We cannot
20 R. Bendix, Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Embattled
Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge, supra note 19 at 116-138; Thomas Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)

110-134.
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here be concerned with an analysis of those changes themselves. Rather we
are attempting to focus our attention on the response of the intellectuals to
their perception of change. The nature of this study is such that this paper
is necessarily loose and explorative, attempting to establish a general perspective towards a new phenomena.
Although our major concern here is to gain an understanding of the
character of life in the refugee centre and the relevance which that has for
the communication between law and sociology, we are also interested in a
broader issue which seems immediately relevant. The refugee centre is a
man-made, analytic concept that describes a state of mind - a state of mind
in transition, so to speak. An important feature of that state of mind is a
radical skepticism which Bendix correctly identifies as an important ingredient of good scholarship, but one which, under certain conditions, could
lead to a dangerous "distrust of reason". 21 In his recent address to the American Sociological Association, Bendix, in fact, argued that this is happening
to a serious extent in American social science. He correctly sees it as threatening the basic assumptions about the possibilities for an objective, rational
body of knowledge that tries to understand human behavior.
Given that the refugee centre is marked by a radical skepticism, it is also
characterized by a serious commitment to enrich presently existing bodies
of knowledge and to expand the parameters presently circumscribing them,
in order to deal with the newly perceived emerging problems of contemporary
society. An important feature of the refugee centre experience is a radical
questioning of the basic assumptions that have made knowledge possible.
What can be interpreted as a serious "distrust of reason" may also be seen
as a temporary, intermediary stage of development in the life cycle of bodies
of thought. It is a stage in which old ideas and values are being re-examined
by a new generation of intellectuals in an attempt to restructure and redefine
bodies of knowledge, and the purposes for which knowledge is to be employed. For this reason, it is important to understand the character of life in
the refugee centre and to see that experience as having an important influence
on the subsequent responses of intellectuals. The nature of the experience
in the refugee centre defines, in part, the conditions under which the emerging
problems and new ideas are incorporated into the existing bodies of knowledge. This may involve the creation of new bodies of knowledge. The distrust
of reason which Bendix refers to (and which is characteristic of the "crisis
in the universities") is only one alternative response, and can be seen as a
measure of the capacity of traditional bodies of knowledge to respond to
movements for change.
Our argument, then, is that the initial frustration sensed upon discovering the difficulties involved in interdisciplinary communications is not only
inevitable, but also very revealing of the natural history of ideas and bodies
of knowledge.
An important distinction must be kept in mind throughout this exploration. We are not arguing that the frustrations and failures encountered in
attempts at cross disciplinary communication cause a more radical critique
21

Bendix, supra note 20, passim.
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of knowledge, although they do contribute to the character of the experience
in the refugee centre. Rather, that experience discloses the degree to which
interdisciplinary communication has attracted those people who are dissatisfied, to various degrees, with the presently existing bodies of knowledge.
Moreover, the frustrations and failures disclose some important characteristics of the development and institutionalization of bodies of knowledge.
Remembering that the original impulse to be involved in cross-disciplinary
communication was inspired by a desire to add to, or enrich, the presently
existing bodies of knowledge so that they might cope with emerging problems, this desire becomes channeled, or structured in different ways, by the
nature of this experience. The conceptualization of the problem of interdisciplinary communication in this way enables us to draw analytical attention to the response of existing bodies of knowledge as a variable which
affects the experience in the refugee centre.
"FactoringOut Goals"; Alternative Responses to the Experience of
The Refugee Centre As Alternative Solutions to the DemandsFor Change
Although this paper can not pretend to be a phenomenological history
of interdisciplinary communication, there is enough evidence to suggest that
there are at least five alternative responses to life in the refugee centre. It is
useful to conceptualize these alternatives as "stages" in the experience which
may or may not attract adherents and successfully become legitimized goals
and institutionalized solutions to demands for change. Some members may
see the alternatives, in retrospect, as stages; others may become involved with
them as "sub-specializations" which satisfy their demands for change.
The first I would identify as philosophical, or meta-theoretical and
methodological, which often incorporates an interest in the history of ideas
in at least one specialized area. The second is the development of an entirely
new specialization which successfully incorporates the collaboration between
different bodies of thought (for example, urban studies, the politics of education, and the sociology of law). The third represents a return to the original
disciplines after a period of enrichment through contact with other disciplines. This alternative may appear to be the most indirect, diffuse and subtle,
but it is one which definitely affects the character of the original disciplines
over a period of time. The fourth alternative could be characterized as a
"distrust in reason", and essentially represents the failure of the experience
in the refugee centre to offer viable alternative ways of relating to institutionalized knowledge. The fifth alternative is revolution in Thomas Kuhn's
sense of a scientific breakthrough
in thought which demands a total restruc22
turing of the discipline.
There seems to be a natural tendency to define these alternatives as
successes or failures. Analytically this could be useful, although it is inherently problematic. For instance, we could see that the third alternative does
allow for gradual change of the original body of knowledge. However, does
it represent a failure or a success of interdisciplinary collaboration? Simi22
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962) [hereinafter Scientific Revolutions].
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larily, a scientific revolution represents an important breakthrough in scientific thought and would be regarded as a success in that respect. However,
it can also be seen as a failure of the original discipline to incorporate new
philosophic ideas into its structure without radically redefining the character
of that discipline.
Thus, it is crucial to note that, except for the fourth alternative, all of
these alternatives are different ways of satisfying the original utopian demands for change in the character of the original disciplines. Depicting interdisciplinary communication as a utopian movement for change is a recognition of the degree to which utopian movements are always "multipotential".
Although a dissatisfaction with the original character of the disciplines and
relativism as an ideological weapon are shared features, the demands for
change can be satisfied in a number of different ways, which are only discovered to be viable for specific participants as a result of various kinds of
experiences encountered in the refugee center.
The mark of a successful ideology is its ability to attract different
interest groups. 28 Because its ends are never clearly articulated, assumptions
are made that there exists a consensus of these groups although, as in the
refugee camp, there are at least four different definitions of the ends, as
represented by four different ways satisfying the demand for change. Yet,
because the measure of success of an ideology is its ability to attract diverse
interest groups, we witness here and in other Utopian movements, which by
definition have no readily articulated ends, an assumption that goal-consensus exists.
Mannheim's analysis of post enlightenment Western society provides a
useful framework in which we can appreciate the implications of this feature
of Utopian movements for our understanding of the relationship between
means and ends in social action. Mannheim's analysis of Ideology and
Utopia rests on an appreciation of the degree to which "rational" purposeful
social action is only one of the variables that adds to our understanding of
social change. His analysis of social change in fact rests on,

"

. . . this

conception of ideology and utopia (which) deals with a reality that discloses
itself only in actual practice". 24

In a complex, modern industrial society undergoing rapid and radical
change, it is no longer possible for religion and the church to play the integrative role which was possible in a pre-industrial world. This integrative role
involved a definition of a reality that could be culturally shared. Mannheim's
history and interpretation of ideological conflict since the enlightenment
rests on an assumption that in the absence of a shared view of reality, there
is an inevitable "quest for reality" 25 which takes on the character of ideological conflicts between competing views of reality offered by different
schools of thought. He argues;
... Only in a world in upheaval, in which fundamental new values are being

created and old ones destroyed, can intellectual conflict go so far that antagonists
23R. Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York: Harper and Row,
1956),
see the Preface.
24
Id. at 97.
25
ldeology, supra note 11 at 97.
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will seek to annihilate not merely the specific beliefs and attitudes of one another,
but also the intellectual foundations upon which these beliefs and attitudes rest.26

By depicting interdisciplinary communication as a utopian movement
we are sensitized to that function of bodies of knowledge which offers a
particular view of reality or "world view". The genius of Thomas Kuhn's
Structure of Scientific Revolution, is its employment of the concepts of
"normal" and "revolutionary" science, which, when dialectically applied to
the history of scientific thought is borne out in even the most "objective"
disciplines. Kuhn's analysis of "revolutionary" periods of scientific development reveals how the development of "normal" science rests on an inarticulated "world view" or paradigm. This concept of paradigm involves essentially a shared consensus as to the character or ends and means of that body
of knowledge.
Throughout the remainder of these notes, we explore the degree to
which interdisciplinary communication, as a utopian movement for change,
attempts to alter the structure of the disciplines by radically changing the
"world view" and the character of the dominant paradigm.
In this process, we see the important relationship between interdisciplinary movements and professional "identity crisis" which often accompany
them. In modern society, intellectuals are playing an increasingly important role in the development and perpetuation of ideas and values which
structure that society. Consequently, a radical critique of a body of thought
involves a radical critique of a whole style of life and system of responsibilities. Remembering Feuer's definition of the intellectual quoted above, to
attempt to redefine the world view or dominant paradigm of one's discipline
is to attempt to seek a "mode of existence more in accord with (one's)
philosophy, ideas and feelings".
The phenomena of the intellectual culture hero (and the related "cultism") is also an important feature of utopian movements. David Reisman,
for instance, notices the development of cultism in efforts of communication
between law and the social sciences. He argues:
If one is jogging along an already laid out track ... it is one thing, but if one is
exploring rather new areas, with all the misgivings to which pioneering intellectual
work is prone, then to meet constantly the really amiable needling of the skeptical
law man may be tiresome. A certain amount of cultism, even occultism ... is an
almost necessary part of new intellectual enterprise, and although, like any other
morale building effort, this can go too far and become
and end in itself it is part
27
of the protection that uncertain activity demands.

Along with cultism, occultism, and culture heroes, we often find the
development of a new language; a system of metaphors, codes and "cliches"
develops which distinguish the innovators from the mainstream thinkers, but
also, at the same time, allows them to exchange ideas about topics that previously have been defined as outside the concern of the traditional disciplines. In many cases, the development of a separate language is recognized
as being necessary to the development of new ways of conceptualizing old
problems, or problems which are seen to be entirely new. The interest in
20
27

Id. at 66.

David Reisman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training, and Colleagueship
in Law and Sociology, supra note 15 at 26.
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various forms of linguistic determinism that often develops in these movements can be explained in part, as an effort to justify the need for a new
language. A new language then, is seen as a way of liberating the mind
from biases and prejudices inherent in the view of reality incorporated into
mainstream thought. Reisman recognizes this feature of "pioneering intellectual work" and comments on its inevitability:
Furthermore, we must also recognize that a certain amount of terminological
solipsism has accompanied some of the most truly innovative work, as in psychoanalysis, as well as some of the most unfruitful work. Such solipsism may serve
to protect tentative gropings from too ready incorporation into the main body
of accepted views, and psychoanalysis is an example of a movement that needed
in its early stages to be protected from the overwhelming leveling power of common sense. Indeed, common sense, as we have already seen, frequently characterizes the law professor's
impermeable defense against sociological or psychological
28
experimentation.

In the literature on communication between law and the social sciences

this cultism involves the glib, yet often ambivalent reference to certain key
thinkers as a source of legitimation. 29 Interestingly enough, many of the same
thinkers are employed by those interested in communication between other
disciplines, suggesting again the degree to which interdisciplinary communication can be seen as a larger movement for change with a unique, although
not clearly articulated direction. Thinkers like R.D. Laing, Noam Chomsky,
Thomas Kuhn, Lon Fuller, Erving Gofiman, Lawrence Friedman, Wittgenstein, come to be used as variations of the "culture hero". They become
radical "symbols", having gained the respect of their fellow colleagues on
the basis of their scholarship, in spite of their sometimes radical criticism
of, and departure from, their respective mainstreams. Above and beyond
their scholarly contributions, which are genuinely a source of inspiration,
and also an important mutual ground for discourse, they are important
legitimating figures for those who attempt
to wander outside the boundaries
s0
of the established bodies of knowledge
One of the consequences of this employment of culture heroes is a
tendency to make more use of their symbolic attributes (i.e., radical, marginal,
interdisciplinary, pioneer, etc.) than the substantive content of their work as
models for further research. However, we would argue that this fact is a
reflection of the attraction interdisciplinary communication has for different
interest groups whose definitions of the goals of interdisciplinary communication are not yet clearly articulated. Consequently, there is an affinity with
a group of thinkers who seem to share a similar sensibility, and orientation
to knowledge, although they may represent different solutions to the demands
for change. In fact, we would argue that these culture heroes share not only
a desire for change in the structure of knowledge, but also a commitment to
phenomenology as a philosophic idea. Thus, in the utopian movement for
change, phenomenology or relativism becomes an ideological weapon.
28 Id. at 39.
29 Id.

30P. Savoy, Towards a New Politics of Legal Education (1970), 79 Yale L. J.
444 is an excellent example of a recent work which is neither glib, nor ambivalent, but
rather exceedingly careful in attempting to draw together many ideas and many thinkers
who are often used as "culture heroes" in the manner described in this paper. It
represents well the scope and the tone I had in mind in describing the concerns of some
members of the "refugee centre".
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The distinction between scholarly research which explores or documents the ways in which certain ideas and perceptions of reality have been
shaped by particular socio-economic and historical conditions, and the use
of that research as an ideological weapon, must be kept clear. For our purposes then, it is crucial to note that above and beyond the merit of the work
in its own right, that work is often motivated by a desire to re-orient a discipline, and/or to document the process by which ideas have been incorporated into the mainstream of a discipline. In that respect, this type of
research can be used ideologically for it allows us to see knowledge, on one
level of analysis, as a cultural product. In this sense, knowledge is used as
data which reflects a particular historical situation, and a particular definition
of reality which is always influenced by the relationship of the observer to
the larger society. The main thrust of the utopian movement for change is
an introspective, self-conscious appraisal of the unconscious molding of
bodies of knowledge by the conditions under which they developed historically. Hence "relativism" becomes an ideological weapon, and research done
by respectable scholars is used as evidence of the existence of certain biases
in the world views or paradigms of the established disciplines.
In depicting interdisciplinary communication as a refugee centre, we
are able to bring into relief the idea that this stage in the movement for
change involves not only widely discrepant and vaguely articulated goals, but
also a shared ideological commitment to change, or at least a dissatisfaction
with, and a detachment from, the established disciplines. Much of the communication across disciplines consists of ideological attacks on the methodology and conceptual tools of the presently-existing bodies of knowledge.
We have already noted that this can also be seen as f stage in the development of new sub-disciplines, or in the development of a philosophical history of thought. In this way, although the tone of the refugee centre may
be seen as "counter-productive", it can also be seen as a temporary period
of intellectual "stock-taking", in which new areas of intellectual discourse are
carved out. However, insofar as the goals are unarticulated, a critical methodological and philosophical history of bodies of thought is rarely seen as a
legitimate goal of interdisciplinary communication. As a result, many of the
successful encounters between different bodies of thought remain "invisible"
unless they are attached to discrete sub-disciplines, such as the philosophy
of science, various histories of thought, etc. Of course, these encounters are
often gradually diffused and incorporated into the presently existing bodies
of thought after the intellectuals leave the refugee centre and return to their
original disciplines.
Because the refugee centre represents a stage in which goals have not
yet been articulated, much of the confusion and frustration surrounding
interdisciplinary communication can be seen as a confusion about ends and
means. We have stressed the inherent and ironic paradox, that relativism or
phenomenology is an idea which is incorporated into both the utopian movement and its ideology. It is this ironic paradox that Mannheim claims has
generated the intellectual crisis which is characteristic of our age, and which
has stimulated a "quest for reality". What is involved is a self-conscious
realization that knowledge is always a function of a particular "point of view".
The quest for reality then becomes a quest to establish a body of knowledge
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that will afford a view of reality which somehow incorporates all possible
points of view. The degree of interest generated in interdisciplinary communication by this quest is a measure of its status as a utopian movement and
as a reflection of "intellectual crisis". As we have argued it is the nature of
utopian goals to remain unanalyseable abstractions. In the same way, the
nature of a world view which incorporates all possible points of view, and
the nature of the body of knowledge which develops from this world view,
can not be known in advance.
It should be noted that we have deliberately employed Mannheim's
concepts of ideology and utopia, realizing that these concepts are often
considered to be "ideologically" distorted. However, using these concepts we
hope to expose issues which often remain covert and by that token ambiguous.
Mannheim's discussion of ideology begins with the reminder that the conception of ideology is incorrectly tied to "Marxism" and tends to polarize
intellectuals in such a way that they ignore issues that are crucial to contemporary, modem industrial society. 31 Mannheim's historical treatment of the
concept of ideology links it to the "rational and calculating mode of thought
characteristic of the enlightenment13 2 and reminds us that we have a tendency to de-emphasize this aspect of ideology and over-emphasize that facet
of ideology which is "irrational", "political" and "de-bunking". However, by
following Mannheim's lead, and looking at ideology and utopia rationally,
we gain the advantage of developing a perspective which permits us to see
ideas, ideologies and utopias as continuously active ingredients of social
processes and of history. Consequently, this analysis does not employ a
"political model" to view the sociology of knowledge, but rather, allows one
to look for conditions under which particular ideas, ideologies and utopias,
become channelled into political movements for change. In this way, it is
useful to conceptualize ideologies and utopias as a continuous part of history
which often remains "latent" or unarticulated.
Although American social science has displayed an interest in "ideas",
"values", "attitudes", and "opinions", there has been surprisingly little work
attempting to document how ideas, values, etc. actually influence the course
of social action. A similar sentiment is expressed by many members of the
refugee centre. We would argue that the interdisciplinary collaboration and
borrowing which is successful is often of the nature of this demonstration.
The entire school of judicial decision-making, for instance, can be seen as an
effort to show how ideas, values, and occupational commitments of a select
group, (i.e. judges) both reflect and determine the nature of justice. Similarly,
Lawrence Friedman, recognizes that there is a commonplace belief that "law
is a product of its environment and responds to social and economic forces",
but he argues that:
...precise demonstrations of the manner in which law makes this response, and
the degree of33 influence of particular social facts on the law, have not been
commonplace.
31
32

Ideology, supra note 11 at 54.
Id. at 63.

33 L. Friedman, Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case Study
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), Preface ix.
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Friedman's book, Contract Law in America is an important and unique
effort, which he believes to be conspicuously absent in the study of law, to
document the relationship between ideas and history. His preface to that
work includes this serious indictment of the failure of law as a discipline to
concern itself with the role of ideas in history:
[There is] nothing, that is, unless it is the devastating obseleteness of legal education, which (except for some meager palliatives in upper class seminars) tends
to develop notions and habits of thought inimical to the study of law either as

a branch of human behavior or as a chapter in the book of human ideas. Legal
to think and act like lawyers",
education, in general, seeks to teach students "how
and turns its back on imparting "mere facts". 34

In Legal Culture and Social Development, Friedman, makes the same
point and briefly sketches the history of American jurisprudence, indicating
the extent to which an appreciation of the dynamic aspect5 of ideas and values
has not been a major concern in American legal thought.3
It is important to point out that Friedman, like many members of the
refugee centre, is committed to a particular conception of what law, as a body
of knowledge, should be doing. He is dissatisfied with what he conceives to
be the dominant definition of the character and goals of a legal education.
Whether or not Friedman actually has spent any time in a "refugee centre"
is not the point. He is cited here rather as an example of one of the alternative
responses to the experience in the refugee centre. The character of his
research is such that it not only is being used in a "symbolic" and legitimizing
way by members of the refugee centre, but that it is also changing the structure of the discipline of law, by gradually incorporating an interest in new
areas of thought. Our argument is that the character of his work also could
be described as an exploration of the implications of "phenomenolgy as a
philosophic idea".
Contract Law In America is in one sense, a phenomenological history
of the idea of contract law and of the judicial institution in a particular state
in America. In that way, it is an attempt to document the relationship between ideas and social and economic institutions. Similarly, Legal Culture
and Social Development represents a concern to achieve a phenomenolgical
understanding of the relationship between particular forms of rational legal
thinking and social development. This is an important demonstration of the
way in which historical conditions determine a view of reality which in its
turn influences the development of subsequent institutional responses.
Consequently, we would argue that the extent to which Friedman is
used as a "culture hero" is the extent to which he is an archetype of the
utopian goals and the ideological means of the interdisciplinary movement.
Instead of further elaboration of Friedman's work as illustrative of this
point, the second part of the paper will attempt to illustrate the extent to
which Friedman's position or "intellectual sensibility" is characteristic of a
more general movement towards change in the presently existing bodies of
knowledge. In a later section of this paper we will argue that there is a
a4 Id. Preface vii-viii.
35 L. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development (1969), 4 Law and Society
Review 29 [hereinafter Legal Culture].
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natural convergence between people such as Friedman, studying public and
private legal systems in the process of development in modern industrial
society, and a growing school in sociology with interests in similar areas of
formal organizations. This is to isolate only one area of convergence, although
the thesis is that other instances of actual, latent or potential collaboration
demonstrate a structurally similar process, even though the focal point of
inquiry is the mental hospital, in some cases, or the drug sub-culture in
others.
In summary, our argument is that by looking at interdisciplinary
communication as a utopian movement for change, we are able to see more
clearly first the extent to which an interest in interdisciplinary communication
represents a demand for change in the ways in which knowledge has been
institutionalized. This demand for change, we argue, is generated by a
dissatisfaction with the existing structure of bodies of knowledge and their
ability to solve emerging real and intellectual problems. (We distinguish
between real and intellectual in order to emphasise that a consensus as to
what constitutes a "real problem" involves more than simply an intellectual
perception of a phenomena as a problem. Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolution, for instance, discloses that the revolutionary scientist conceives of
the ordinary, daily "puzzles" of normal science as essentially "anomalies",
which contradict the very basic assumptions made by normal science.) Second,
the conceptualization of interdisciplinary communication movements as utopian movements for change allows us to examine the extent to which relativism is being used as an ideological weapon, in the effort to redefine the
dominant world view of the presently-existing bodies of knowledge. Thirdly,
we are also able to see that the goals of interdisciplinary communication are
sufficiently vague or unarticulated and thus allow for a number of alternative
ways of satisfying demands for change. We have noted this to be a characteristic of utopian movements for change. Finally, by using the metaphor of the
refugee centre we are able to isolate conceptually the character of the utopian
movement, and to see it as a temporary stage in a movement toward change
in the dominant "paradigm" of various disciplines.
Part II
In the next section of these notes we shall attempt to elaborate on the
character of the refugee centre by illustrating the ways in which phenomenology as a philosophic idea, or relativism as an ideological weapon, is a
central feature of interdisciplinary movements.
We have defined paradigm in terms of the particular view of reality
operative in the development of "normal science". The character of the
paradigm can be seen as a particular configuration of ends and means which
define both what the body of knowledge "should" be doing and the appropriate conceptual and methodolgical tools. To support this argument we will
briefly summarize Kuhn's thesis that for normal science to exist there must
be a sense of commitment to the view of reality which is incorporated in the
dominant paradigm. 36 A sense of commitment to the world view or view of
36

Scientific Revolutions, supra note 21.
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reality offered by the dominant paradigm can be seen as an assumption that
the ends (or goals) of that paradigm and the means for achieving those goals
are shared by members of the intellectual community.
Law can be seen as, in one sense, a body of knowledge, a discipline,
although it seems not only more correct but also more useful to realize that
it is also the content of a program of legal education. The program of legal
education structures the students' perception of what law is, what it does,
and how it can be used. It is in that sense that law provides a view of reality
that is unique to students of law, even given that different legal education
programs tend to create different definitions of the "lawyer" and his relationship to the larger society.
Insofar as interdisciplinary communication is a movement for change,
we can see that what is being attempted is, in fact, a redefinition of ends
and means; that is, a redefinition of what the body of knowledge should be
doing, and how. The major concern of this part of the paper is to show
that life in the refugee centre (which we argue is a reflection of the intellectual
crisis of our time) indicates that a consensus as to ends and methods no
longer exists within the presently existing bodies of knowledge which attempt
to describe and explain human behavior. Moreover, the perpetuation of
unrealistic or non-supportable assumptions about the degree to which a
consensus exists as to the ends and means of a body of knowledge can be
seen as the definition of "breakdown of communication". In documenting
this position, we maintain an analytic distinction between different levels of
abstraction - the micro or interpersonal level, the middle range in which we
use bodies of thought as the unit of analysis, and the meta-theoretical level
in which views of reality, or world views, are the basic unit of analysis.
In one sense, we are attempting to apply the structure of Kuhn's thesis
to law and the social sciences; that is, we will attempt to demonstrate that
the utopian movement for change is a "revolution" against what is perceived
as the dominant paradigm in American social thought over the last thirty or
forty years, and that relativism is the ideological weapon in that revolution.
However, our concerns are different from Kuhn's in a few important respects.
First, we are interested in demonstrating the extent to which the intellectuals'
perception of what they are involved in doing is an attempt to facilitate a
"paradigm shift" which will incorporate the insight that views of reality and
bodies of knowledge are social and cultural "products". Kuhn's primary aim
is to document the structure of scientific revolution itself. Second we are
interested in developing the idea that intellectuals are primarily dissatisfied
with the presently structured bodies of knowledge and that a total revolution
is only one of the alternative ways of satisfying the demand for change.
Finally, a major purpose of this section is to show that a breakdown in
communication both within and between disciplines can be seen in terms of
the lack of a consensus as to the goals or ends of particular bodies of knowledge. We submit that the "talking past one another" which seems to characterize life in the refugee centre can be understood in terms of different goals
and different perceptions of those goals.
A thorough sociological history of bodies of thought or knowledge
would involve an analysis of the norms and institutionalized structures which
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guarantee a consensus or a shared commitment to the dominant paradigm
in periods of normal science. However, such an analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper. It would involve a sociological history of institutions of higher
learning, whereas our dominant concern in this paper is not the actual
structural changes in society and the universities, but rather the responses of
the intellectuals to their perception of change. Instead of carefully documenting those structural changes and the specific connections between them and
the intellectuals' perception of them, we shall assume these connections to
exist.
It is consistent with the major thesis of this paper that American social
thought has not been concerned to demonstrate these connections, which are
essentially the connections between ideas and institutions. As a result, we
know very little about how the form of legal education, for instance, structures the role of the professional lawyer in American or Canadian society.
It is only recently that those thinkers who are interested in widening the parameters of the disciplines (or shifting the dominant paradigm) have begun to
deal with these issues. Clearly, a major concern in the refugee centre is how
to deal with the insights gained from the recent attempts to extend legal
services to underprivileged classes. Participation in urban renewal projects or
citizen participation groups and other aspects of the "new lawyering" necessitate a re-thinking of the role of the professional lawyer, how that role is
structured and how the educational and training process influences and
perpetuates certain values, occupational commitments and views of reality.
In the same way, the refugee centre is a place for psychiatrists who
have read R. D. Laing and Goffman to redefine their occupational commitments and the ways in which those occupational commitments have been
structured by their educational experience. But clearly, Laing and Goffman,
like other "culture heroes", have an appeal beyond the particular occupational
contexts for which their work is immediately relevant. They have achieved
the status of culture hero not only because they deal with issues that seem
immediately relevant to a new generation of intellectuals, but also because
they have incorporated into their own work at once a criticism of the established disciplines and their "view of reality", and also have provided
directions for the development of what appears to be a radically new way of
viewing the world.
By depicting interdisciplinary communication as a movement for change
and by recognizing that various alternatives to demands for change are
essentially a product in part of that experience in the refugee centre, we are
able to understand that, under certain conditions (which might be clarified by
an analysis of the structural changes in the university), this experience could
invoke a serious "distrust of reason" that may or may not be temporary for
some members of the refugee centre. Similarly, revolutionary demands for the
total restructuring of a discipline and of a professional commitment can be
analytically isolated and understood more readily in this context.
Phenomenology as a PhilosophicIdea
In The Sociology of Philosophic Ideas, Feuer discusses the ways in
which philosophic ideas have been used historically in movements for change,
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including changes in the world view or the dominant orientation of knowledge, and in movements of social and political reform.37 He addresses the
dominant assumption made by those who claim an automatic link between
politics and philosophy, or politics and knowledge, and those who claim
that every system of ideas implies a particular policy meaning (Mannheim
addresses the same question when he argues that an analytic distinction must
be made between ideology and utopia). Feuer's analysis of philosophic ideas
that have been historically linked to particular political policies (e.g. liberalism and empiricism; economic determinism and revolution, etc.) discloses
the extent to which different philosophic ideas have been used to achieve
different social consequences. He argues that;
The changing social role of the same philosophy in the course of history leads
us then to the following thesis that philosophic ideas are multi-potential, that
is, given different social circumstances, the same philosophic idea will take on a
different significance for behavior and promote different emotions, feelings and
actions. The policy meaning only becomes determined when relevant social
variables are specified.38

We would argue that this position describes the utopian element of life
in the refugee centre, for the dominant philosophic idea is being used to
achieve various ends: for some, the demand for change can be satisfied by a
formal recognition of the value of expanding the parameters of a discipline
to include methodology or a philosophic history of that discipline; for others,
a total reorientation of the discipline is demanded. One of the causes of the
breakdown of communication within disciplines is that a consensus about the
ends is assumed, at least by those committed to the dominant paradigm, but
does not, in fact, exist.
Feuer's sociology of philosophic ideas develops three generalizations
which are relevant for our purposes. The first one is the "principle of Counter
Determinism" which is based on the idea that ".... we tend to reject the
opinions and ideas of persons to whom we are opposed".3 9 This is an
important description of the behaviour in some corners of the refugee centre.
For when there is a disagreement or perhaps a lack of consensus as to the
ends of a body of knowledge, there is a tendency to assume that those ideas
held by the opposing intellectual position are ideologically distorted by their
"definition of the situation" or the definition of what a given body of knowledge should be doing, what kinds of questions it should be asking and to
what purposes it allows its expertise to be employed. We will expand this
idea further in a discussion of the "value-free" and the "end of ideology"
debates in sociology. These debates essentially represent a political conflict
over the responsibilities and the role of the intellectual in contemporary
society.
The second generalization developed by Feuer is the "Principle of the
Life Cycle of Philosophic Ideas". He argues that:
They begin as liberating, offering a fresh perspective, stimulating new experiences
and scientific advances with their live idiom and images...40
37

Supra note 9.
38M. at 78.

81 Id. at 79.
40 Id.at 80.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

1971]

However, once a "philosophic idea" becomes accepted in the intellectual
community and established as a dominant "world view" which defines the
parameters around intellectual discourse,
".... it becomes hereditary creed4 (and) it ceases to exercise evocative function ...
It becomes official philosophy". 1

Our discussion of Kuhn's thesis will attempt to indicate that this principle
is operative in the structure of scientific revolutions and in the distinction
between normal and revolutionary science. The discussion of consensus as
to "world view" is illustrative of the same phenomena on a different level of
abstraction.
Feuer's perspective of viewing ideas and bodies of knowledge as having
real histories allows us to understand the third generalization developed in
The Sociology of PhilosophicIdeas, "The Principle of Overstatement". Here,
the ideas and the new emotions attached to them "... project themselves

into unlimited generalization", 42 and it is in this respect that phenomenology
as a philosophic idea is used as an ideological weapon against the dominant
world view of the presently existing bodies of knowledge. The point to be
made here is that during periods of rapid and radical change, which are
reflected in periods of intellectual crisis, these processes are accelerated and
revolutionary demands for change are intensified.
Assumptions of Consensus on the Level of Disciplines...
The DistinctionBetween Normal and Revolutionary Science
We have extrapolated from Kuhn's thesis the notion that, for bodies of
knowledge to develop, a sense of commitment to a particular view of reality
is required and that this view of reality can be seen as implying a consensus
as to the ends and means of that body of knowledge. Perhaps it would be
useful here to briefly review his thesis and to point to a few of the important
implications of his orientation to knowledge.
It is important to keep in mind that we have given Kuhn the label
of "culture hero". In this discussion of his thesis we are not only outlining
his argument but are also using him as data to support our own thesis. We
are looking at Kuhn's thesis as an indicator of the degree to which his work,
which is in itself both interdisciplinary and meta-theoretical, is an archetype
for one of the alternative ways of satisfying demands for change within
the refugee centre. Kulm's work is essentially an application of phenomenology as a philosophic idea (or relativism as an intellectual stance) to the
history of natural science. In that way, his particular intellectual interests
involve an expansion of the parameters around the natural sciences, as a
field of inquiry, to include a phenomenological history of science.
Kuhn's basic thesis is that, contrary to the dominant view of science as
an additive accumulation of objectively-verified knowledge that follows its
previous findings in some logical manner, the development of science is more
characterized by non-linear patterns which are influenced by diverse human
4

1Id. at 81.
42d. at 81.
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"irrationalities, values and extra-scientific forces that resemble life in the real
world more than life in the mythologically pure scientific laboratory."
One of the important implications of Kuhn's work is that modem industrial society has mythologized science and rational thought as the only
objective reality that we can know. Science has been elevated to the level of
pure, unadulterated, sacred reason. The "Truth" somehow exists as the
essence of the natural sciences and the role of the scientist is to extrapolate
antiseptically little particles of that truth until all the pieces are added
together to form a configuration known as "objective reality".
Many intellectuals have quarrelled with this particular form of scientism48 and many have attempted to document how science progresses from
deep philosophical and human impulses. That is, scientific knowledge is
always a "product" in some sense of the thinker and the object of thought.
The scientist always brings man made theories, concepts and questions to
the object or problem of observation. Rene Dubos, for instance, expresses
the sentiment that, "....

Science does not progress only by inductive, analyti-

cal knowledge. The imaginative speculations of the mind come first, the
verification and the analytic breakdown come only later." 44 He argues that
this view of science is,
...Determined by the belief that scientific questions have their origin deep in

human consciousness, often below the analytical level. They constitute restate-

ments of large questions that philosophers formulated long before scientists began
to work on their determinism, questions which have indeed preoccupied men
ever since they began to think - even before the beginnings of formal philosophy. Many ancient myths are the first statements in symbolic
form of abstract
themes not yet formulated in philosophical or scientific terms.4 5

Dubos's view of science, which celebrates it as a basically human activity
among other human activities (e.g. philosophy, myth making, etc.), has been
rather uncommon. Instead, a view of rational scientific thought is perpetuated
which posits science as a super human activity, subject to none of the
weaknesses (or strengths) of other human activities.
Friedrichs, in A Sociology of Sociology, expresses a similar sentiment in
his discussion of how the dominant view of science has penetrated western
rational thought, closing off alternative roots of inquiry. 46 Friedrichs elegantly
sums up Kuhn's argument and describes the dynamics of the development of
bodies of rational thought in this way:
... in fact, major shifts in empirical and or theoretical models are grounded in
what are essentially conversion experiences in which a new "world view" competes
almost ideologically with an older frame of reference. There is no simple, cleancut movement from "error to truth". What appears is a competing gestalt that
redefines crucial problems, introduces new methods and establishes uniquely new
standards for solutions. At the moment of polarization the devices and procedures
that mediate differences in perspective and evidence in "normal" or non-crisis
science fail. Advocates of alternative models talk past one another, for there is
4
sSee, for instance, W. Weaver, Some Imperfections in Science in S. Rapport and
H. Wright (eds.), Science: Method and Meaning (New York: Washington Square
Press, 1964); B. Barber, Science and the Social Order (New York: Collier Books,
1962); Rene Dubos, The Dreams of Reason (New York: Columbia University, 1961).
44
1d. at 122.
45 Id. at 123.
46
Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1970).
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- at least for that moment - no fully institutionalized framework of substantive

assumptions that both accept. Personal factors, aesthetic predilections, the age,
role and private individuals
47 and sub-specializations all are involved. Persuasion
rather than proof is king.

What Kuhn has done is to characterize the relationship between normal
and revolutionary science as dialectical and thus permit new insights about
both "normal" science and crisis stage or revolutionary science. If we are to
use Kuhn's work to understand life in the "refugee centre", it is important
to realize how the existence of the refugee centre is a reflection of some
perceived existence of a crisis in intellectual thought. The very fact that
intellectuals have defined a given body of knowledge as failing to explain or,
in some cases, to recognize emerging real and intellectual problems, is an
expression of the absence of a sense of commitment to the dominant world
view of that discipline.
Again, Kuhn offers an interesting concept which is a useful description
of that particular sense of dissatisfaction with the presently structured bodies
of knowledge. His idea of "technical breakdown" as a necessary feature of
revolutionary breakthroughs in thought expresses the perceived inadequacy
of the dominant paradigm in solving problems considered by some to be a
part of the very definition of that discipline. We have noted that Kuhn has
shown that those scientists who remain committed to the dominant paradigm
continue to see the technical breakdown as indicative of normal science
"puzzles" that can be solved by that dominant paradigm. However, the
revolutionary scientist, who is less committed to the particular view of reality
incorporated into that discipline, is essentially responsible for the "definition
of the situation" as representing a technical breakdown. Kuhn's history of
scientific revolution discloses that revolutionary scientific discoveries are
usually made by those whose lack of commitment to the dominant paradigm
seems to be based on the fact that they are young and/or new to the field.
The point to be made here is that, in the refugee centre, there is sometimes not a consensus that a technical breakdown has occurred in one or
another of the relevant bodies of thought. The confusion caused by the lack
of consensus on this particular point is at least as great as the confusion
created by a lack of consensus within each of the disciplines as to whether
or not a technical breakdown or crisis stage exists within the dominant paradigm. What happens, then, is that those who remain committed to the
dominant paradigm fail to see a technical breakdown and fail to see the
importance of the lack of consensus in relation to the nature of the world
view of that paradigm. This is, in part, because they fail to see the relationship between "normal and revolutionary science". Those who are committed
to the dominant paradigm assume that they are viewing reality, rather than
a particular view of reality incorporated into the dominant paradigm. Kuhn
says that scientists do not see things as something, they merely see. They
assume that their definition of reality is shared. It is in response to this view,
we would argue, that phenomenology is employed as an ideological tool.
It is an attempt to show that ideas and bodies of knowledge historically have
been shaped by the point of view of the observer and the position of that
observer in an historically specific context.
47
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Assumptions that there exists a shared view of reality, and a particular
definition of the nature of knowledge, and the character of any given body of
knowledge tend to imply the existence of a particular mythology about the
character of both a discipline and the people attracted to it. Although the
mythology looks different depending upon whether one views the discipline
from the inside, or from the outside, during periods of normal science we
could speak of a fairly coherent mythology about a discipline's goals, methods,
and its criteria for verifying its knowledge or truths. During periods of
revolutionary science or intellectual crisis however, assumptions are often
made about the character of certain bodies of knowledge, which are not
shared by all members of the refugee centre. Often the revolutionary legal
scholar assumes that sociology, for instance, has a particular character,
based on a dominant myth of sociologists, which is in fact the character of
sociology that the sociologists in the refugee centre are rebelling against or
with which they, at least, are dissatisfied. So, one of the reasons for the
breakdown of communication, and the ultimate frustration in attempts at
interdisciplinary communication between members of the refugee centre is
the assumption that all sociologists share a commitment to the dominant
mythology of what a sociologist is interested in doing and how he does it.
We have argued that there is at a meta-theoretical level, an ideological
commitment shared across disciplines which attracts, originally, the malcontents, to the refugee centre. We will also argue that there has existed a
consensus on a meta-theoretical level which allows us to conceptualize the
existence of a dominant paradigm that cuts across disciplines. However,
before we look at the literature which supports this position we shall examine
the assumptions about consensus on the micro-level as a way of realizing
the significance of the distinction between the existence of a consensus and
the assumption that a consensus does exist.
Assumptions of Consensus on a Micro-Level
Thomas Scheff, in Towards a Sociological Model of Consensus, emphasizes the significance of the distinction between assumptions of consensus
and an actual consensus in ordinary, day-to-day, inter-personal communication.48 He reviews the literature on consensus and defines two major categories; the first represents a highly psychological and individualistic approach,
and the second is a more sociological or co-orientation approach. The first
category is essentially American and is represented by Bales and Slater; the
second has a more "European" and classical character going back to Durkheim and Schelling, although it was in a sense "re-discovered" by Dewey and
Mead and America. Scheff attempts to work from the second tradition,
49
although he draws on important research done by Newcomb and R.D. Laing.
48

Thomas Scheff, Towards a Sociological Model of Consensus (1967),

Sociological Review, 32-46, [hereinafter Model of Consensus].
American
4

32

9Newcomb, A Study of Consensus in Merton, et. al. (eds.), Sociology Today
New York: Harper and Row, .1959); H. Phillipson, R. D. Laing, and Russell Lee,
nterpersonal Perception:A Theory and A Method of Research (New York: Springle,
1966)
e,. 5.
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Scheff defines complete consensus as existing "....

when there is an

infinite series of reciprocating understandings between the members of the
group concerning the issue". 50 Departing from the three levels of co-orientation of Laing, H. Phillipson and Lee which they describe as "agreement",
"understanding", and "realization", Scheff distinguishes four levels of assumptions with respect to the existence of a consensus between social actors. His
thesis is that the assumptions made by social actors about the ends of their
"communication" and the means of communicating are an important determinant of the form and success of that communication. Scheff's four levels
are: first, "monolithic consensus", where all agree and all understand they
agree; second, "pluralistic ignorance", where the majority agree but think
there is disagreement; third, "dissensus", where the majority disagree and
understand that they do not agree; and, fourth, "false consensus", where
the majority do not agree but think that they do.
Although the scope of this paper does not permit an analysis of
communication between law and sociology within the context of Schefi's
model, it is useful to realize the complexities involved in consensus and to
be aware of the distinction between consensus and assumptions about consensus. The importance of this distinction is exemplified by David Reisman's
discussion of the disappointment of the legal scholar in discovering that what
the sociologist meant by interdisciplinary communication between law and
sociology was a study of the lunch time conversations of lawyers, 5 '
Of course, the lunch time conversations of lawyers may be of interest
to the sociologist for an almost infinite number of theoretical concerns.
Reisman sees the development of the sociology of occupations and professions as an important contribution in and of itself, but one which could also
develop the kind of familiarity necessary to a more sophisticated collaboration between legal scholars and sociologists in areas of mutual theoretical
interests.
Development of A Consensus: Sociology and the Law
Reisman's discussion of this problem illustrates how often different
mythologies of law, sociology and interdisciplinary communication are
exposed only in the process of attempting to cross disciplinary barriers and,
then, tend to discourage further attempts. Distinctions between sociology of
law, sociology in law, sociology of the legal profession, etc., are being made
in the process of interdisciplinary movements. However, it is often surprising
to discover the difficulties involved. Those who continue to pursue cross
disciplinary collaboration discover that the attainment of a working consensus as to basic definitions represents a very challenging first stage. Paul
Bohannan, in fact, makes the point that "... More scholarship has probably

gone into defining and explaining the concept of law than any other concept
still in use in the social sciences". 52 We would argue that the problems
5
OModel
51

of Consensus, supra note 48, at p. 37.
D. Reisman, supra note 27 at 49. See generally, the section entitled "Interpersonal or Interdisciplinary?" at 41-53.
52 p. Bohonnan, Law and Legal Institutions in The Sociology of Law, in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences at 72.
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involved in exploratory research across disciplines, reflected in long discussions about definitions and procedures, can be understood best as a stage at
which a consensus as to the goals of interdisciplinary communication is
developed. This can be seen as a process of discovery of covert mythologies
about the disciplines and their representatives, involving the disclosure of the
assumptions of consensus within and across disciplines.
Several writers have described this early exploratory stage as a necessary
first step in which a "perspective is communicated". 53 Selznick, for instance
delineates three stages that characterize the successful communication between law and sociology. The first, in which an effort is made to communicate
a perspective, he describes as primitive and having the quality of "missionary
zeal".5 4 The second, in which empirical case study work is done, he characterizes as a period of intellectual "craftsmanship", which is by its nature
pitched on a lower level of generality and abstraction. Selznick believes that
sociology of law is just beginning to move into this second stage. The third
stage, he depicts as one of "true intellectual autonomy and maturity", where
there is reasserted the "moral impulse" that marked the first stage of sociological interest and influence on the study of law. He sees the tone of this
stage as being one which will return to a "higher and more sophisticated
level than the first because the second stage provided a sounder base for
critical analysis". 5
It is interesting to note that a dominant focal point of collaboration
between law and sociology has been the study of private and public legal
institutions. Studies of the formal organization have afforded a look at the
development of specialized bodies of law. Selznick points out the importance
of the fact that many sociologists have come to the sociology of law through
their experience in public administration. 0 That the study of public administration has, until recently, been the domain of political science suggests how
extensively the sub-discipline of sociology of law draws upon the approach
and the content of several bodies of thought. The tone of the sociology of
law, which is still verynew, differs from other bodies of thought which have
developed from the collaboration of law with different social sciences in
different historical periods. We should realize that these disparities do exist
because they often reflect important differences in the character of bodies of
thought developed by particular generations of intellectuals in response to
their perception of real and intellectual problems.
A study that would add to our understanding of both the development
of knowledge generally and the processes involved in cross-disciplinary communication, would entail an analysis of the different sub-disciplines that have
developed through collaboration between various schools of thought within
separate social sciences and law in different periods of history. Sociological
jurisprudence, for instance, differs markedly from the more recent body of
sociology of law.G7 We have mentioned that judicial decision-making theory
53 p. Selznick, Sociology of Law in Merton et. al. (eds.), Sociology Today (New
York: Harper and Row, 1959) 116.
54 Id. at 116.
55ld. at 117.
SGOId. at 118.
5
tSee, Schur, Law and Society (New York: Random House, 1968); or R. Yegge
(1970), 4 Law and Society Rev. 327.
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represents a particular intellectual pose, but it is also useful to note that it
had an important connection with a particular school of thought within
political science. Similarly, much of the collaboration between law and anthropology in the 1930's and 1940's was inspired by a particular sentiment that
reflected a more widespread concern with racial discrimination and the response of certain intellectuals to the rise of the giant corporation. Moreover,
the working consensus arrived at must be seen as having a particular tone
and direction which reflected the character of the dominant philosophic idea
prevalent at that time. In this period, the emerging philosophic idea was
functionalism. Functionalism stressed the degree to which patterns of social
action and institutions could be seen as parts of a social system which, one,
were functionally interdependent, and two, contributed to the equilibrium of
the total society. The point to be made is that a careful sociological history
of interdisciplinary movements would have to take into account the idea
that bodies of knowledge have life histories which often include a distinct
stage wherein the major concern is to establish or to communicate a perspective; that is, to develop a consensus as to the ends and means of bodies of
knowledge.
We have defined this stage in contemporary society as a utopian movement for change in the form that knowledge is institutionalized, and have
emphasized the importance of a shared view of reality. Another dimension,
which here can only be mentioned, but should be kept in mind, is that successful interdisciplinary collaboration in the past has often focused on particular social problems, such as international law, the rise of fascism, various
civil rights movements and ethnic and racial discrimination, the labor movement, problems of economic concentration of power, etc. Max Weber has
noted in a different context that, ". . . advances in the sphere of the social
sciences are substantively tied up with the shift in practical problems and
take the guise of a critique of theory construction."' 8
Assumptions of Consensus on the Level of Meta-Theory

The particular view of reality which is incorporated into respective
bodies of thought involves important meta-theoretical assumptions about the
nature of knowledge and reality. During highly introspective periods within
disciplines, many questions that are defined as real and important are addressed to this meta-theoretical level of analysis. The fact that the refugee
centre represents various interest groups who are committed to diverse,
unarticulated ways of conceptualizing their dissatisfaction with the dominant
paradigms, allows for numerous misconceptions which can be analysed in
terms of assumptions of consensus at the meta-theoretical level. Some groups
in the refugee centre, of course, are not interested in exploring these questions
at the same time as other groups and, thus, increase the confusion
and frustration.
Those who are involved in these questions would argue the importance
of deciding whether or not one can "step into the same river twice"; that
58 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, E. Shils and H. A. Finch
(eds.) (New York: Free Press, 1949).
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is, the importance of the first assumptions about the nature of change. This
question is directed to a very high level of abstraction and is often assumed
to be of little interest to the practising social scientist or lawyer during periods
of "normal science". However, when efforts are made to "communicate a
perspective", that is, to incorporate knowledge from outside a discipline, the
question becomes crucial and often involves the use of relativism as an ideological tool which seeks to disclose how ideas of change have influenced the
development of particular bodies of thought. In this way, Nisbet's book,
Social Change in History, which addresses that question, is used by members
own clarification but also as a means
of the refugee centre, not only for their
of attacking the dominant paradigm.59
In that work, Nisbet analyses the idea of change in western philosophy
and the influence that ideas of progress and evolutionary development have
had on social thought in the West. His work includes a careful and unique
analysis of how these ideas have influenced the development and diffusion
of systems theory, functionalism and Parsonian thought.60 He states:
I begin with the very opposite of that most basic of all premises in the theory
of social development, and indeed in most other theories of change which are
current, the premise which tells us that change is "natural" to institutions and all
other forms of social behavior. Change is, however, not "natural", not "Normal",
much less ubiquitous and constant. Fixity is. If we abandon metaphor and the
constructed social system to which metaphor is applied, and if we look at actual
and over that persistence in time
social behavior in place and time, we find over
is the far more common condition of things.6 '
One of the most important points to be drawn from Nisbet's work is
that the view of change which he describes as current has often served as a
way of avoiding the explanation of change; it has served as a "cop-out". The
evolutionary progress model that has been dominant in American social

thought until recently has the effect of creating a view of change so totally
natural that it really does not demand explanation. Conceptualizing the social
system in terms of its functional prerequisites for survival has produced the
effect of an over-all concern with universal similarities in all social systems
and a tendency to ignore the different or alternative ways in which that
survival is possible. A social system and its attributes, then, is considered to
be dead or alive, with nothing in between, apart from casual, off-hand sub-

jective evaluations of points in between those two positions.

What are the effects of this idea of change on our conception of bodies

of knowledge, and how can a distinction between consensus and assumptions
about a consensus help us to understand the implications of this position?
Initially this idea of change assumes that bodies of knowledge are a gradual
accumulation of information and that the shape of that accumulation tends
to be linear. This is the position that Kuhn attacks employing evidence from
his analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions. A discussion of the
structure of scientific revolutions, using the concepts of "normal" and "revolutionary" science, discloses how a body of knowledge, as a system of
GO R. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press,
1969).
00These are assumed to be relevant to the legal scholar who is considering the
advantages of borrowing concepts and methodologies from the social sciences.
oSupra note 59 at 271.
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thought, goes through various stages that can not be defined simply as "dead"
or "alive". The whole concept of "revolutionary science", in fact, is an
important recognition of a stage totally different from being either "dead" or
"alive". Our discussion of the refugee centre is an attempt to see a distinctive
stage in the history of bodies of thought. It is crucial, then, to recognize that
the idea of change held by those within the refugee centre is often very
different from the idea of change that is incorporated into functionalism,
as the dominant established paradigm. Those who become radically discontent with the established paradigm can be seen as demanding the total
or revolutionary transformation of the structure of that paradigm. Others
may be satisfied with the development of new sub-disciplines which are able
to incorporate knowledge from several disciplines. However, in both cases,
change is external to the dominant system and is rarely considered by those
outside the refugee centre who are satisfied with the dominant paradigm and
its ability to explain change. This distinction is important because it allows
us to see the response of the established discipline to demands for change
as a variable which determines the types of alternatives open to those in
the refugee centre. Clearly, it involves the question of whether or not there is
a consensus within and between disciplines, as well as between the refugee
centre and the established disciplines on a meta-theoretical level.
Because the goals in the refugee centre have not been made explicit
and, according to Mannheim can only become explicit within the course of
experience, often the only way of uncovering these goals in any productive
way is through discussions of the ideas of change. Consequently, we can
understand the necessity of introspective, methodological and meta-theoretical
stages in the development of bodies of knowledge, especially in the refugee
centre. Thus, on a meta-theoretical level, one of the most important assumptions is that, because of what we know about the development of knowledge,
we must accept the necessity of these crisis stages as a means of reaching a
consensus which permits the further development of knowledge, either within
bodies of thought or between them. The point to be made here, is that often
an assumption is made that a consensus does exist on this level when, in
fact, either it does not exist or the implications of such an assumption are not
clearly understood.
The Characterof the American Paradigm,and the
Nature of the Emerging "Counter-Paradigm"
Nisbet's position that functionalism has been the dominant paradigm in
American thought in the 20th century is a statement of the degree to which
a consensus did exist and that this consensus, involving a shared commitment to that dominant paradigm, allowed for the development of "normal
science". This position is also supported by Morton White's Social Thought
in America, in his thesis that there has been ".

.

. a certain style of thinking

which dominated America for almost half a century", 2 and which very
definitely cut across traditional discipline boundaries. White refers to this
common thread as a "revolt against formalism" and locates its impact in
pragmatic thinkers like Justice Holmes, John Dewey, Veblen, Beard and
62Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947) 3.
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Robertson. There are important theoretical differences between "functionalism" and "pragmatism". However, what is important to note is the extent
to which it is possible to discover an underlying sentiment which allows one
to see a particular orientation or world view that is shared, and around which
bodies of knowledge are developed.
Developing this argument, we can discern the connection between the
"revolt against formalism" which characterizes the tone of pragmatic thought
in the early twentieth century and the development of the functionalist paradigm in the 1930's and 1940's. Functionalism expresses a definitely "antiformalist" bias in its disregard for history and for structure. It is directed
more to the micro-level of analysis, seeking to understand informal organization, individual
motivation and unintended consequences of rationally
63
directed action.
Consequently, when there is an attack on this dominant paradigm, it is
frequently directed against these features and the ways in which they come
together in a particular configuration, loosely referred to as "functionalism".
The attack is directed against a-historicism, micro-level analysis and a disregard for the degree to which presently structured institutions determine
the behavior of social actors. Thinkers, like Friedman and Selznick in law
and sociology, tend to refer to classsical thinkers like Durkheim and Weber
who represent a particular orientation and sensibility which is distinct from
the mainstream of American thought.
Friedman, for instance, in Legal Culture and Social Development refers
to Max Weber as one of the intellectuals who addressed the issues which
Friedman regards as relevant to contemporary society and to the development of a more comprehensive intellectual paradigm. 64 He notes that there
is now an emerging field "... which aims to explore general connections
between law, culture and development.. ." but "... so far lacks a name and a
shape of its own." 05 But he argues that,
Max Weber probed the connection between the rise of capitalism, modem

rationalism, and the legal order, at the dawn of modern sociology. Unfortunately,
neither sociology nor political science, nor history,
nor economics, nor law, has
carried Weber's line of thought much further.66

Similarly, one could argue that Durkheim's work on law, religion, and
integration has not been significantly advanced by subsequent American
thought. This is true, in spite of Parsons' claims that he has incorporated
Durkheim's thought into his general systems theory. For, in the process of
"importing" Durkheim to America, the original tone and character of his
work was transformed. Durkheim's thesis that shared values, or a moral
order, were necessary for the survival of a social system was taken as an
63 See, for instance, the articles in Demereth and Pelenson (eds.), Systems Change
and Conflict: A Reader on Contemporary Sociological Theory and the Debate over
Functionalism (New York: Free Press, 1967); Mannheim, American Sociology 3-12,
and Foss, The World View of Talcott Parsons at 96-126 in Stein and Vidich (eds.)
Sociology on Trial (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963); or Alvin Gouldner, AntiMinotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology in Horowitz (ed.), The New Sociology
(New6 York: Oxford University Press, 1965) 196-217.
4Legal Culture, supra note 35 at 30.
05 Id. at 30.

0o Id.at 30.
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indicator of the extent to which a system had survived in a state of equilibrium. Because American society seemed to have survived, it was assumed
that it also possessed an integrated value system. Consequently, whether or
not there actually existed a consensus as to values, or how that consensus
was institutionally guaranteed, did not become real issues to be empirically
pursued. Instead, the answers to these macro-level questions were assumed
6
and the focus was shifted to the micro, or individual, level of analysis. r
Moreover, Durkheim's conception of the exteriority of social facts has
come to be read as a vulgar kind of positivism, rather than a sensitive understanding that individuals are involuntarily born into social contexts which
are characterized by already existing institutions embodying ideas and values
of previous generations. Durkheim's concept of "collective conscience" has
been largely ignored by those who were interested in using concepts which
emphasized individual "rational" determinants of behavior. Bendix, who, in
a very important sense, stands outside the mainstream of American sociology,
uses the metaphor of his.orical legacies to describe the degree to which
institutions embody values and ideological solutions to historical power
struggles and, in that sense, are exterior to the individual while at the same
time being important elements of his inherited environment. 8 This view is
similar to Durkheim's idea of exteriority and constraint. Because
institutions and ideas have not been seen as "historical legacies" perpetuating
values and norms and structuring alternatives open to individuals and groups,
macro-level analyses of institutions have not been a dominant concern for
American social science. Scheff makes this point in his attempt to develop a
specifically sociological model of consensus and, in one sense, his work
represents a rediscovery of some of Durkheim's insights which had largely
been "Americanized" by other social scientists.
Therefore, when Friedman calls for a greater concern with legal culture
as a concept which aims at an understanding of the living law operating
within certain formal institutional structures, 9 his appeal could as well be
addressed to the social scientist as to the legal historian. American social
science's concern with the individual as the basic unit of analysis has been
consistent with its essentially a-historical basis. American sociology has
oscillated from a rather brief, early interest in formal structures to an equally
exaggerated but longer-lasting concern with the informal social behavior of
aggregates of individuals. In that sense, even though sociology has used the
concept of "culture", it has lacked the synthesis which would bring together
the micro- and macro-questions, or the formal and informal aspects, of social
behavior. To this extent, what Friedman criticizes in American legal history
may also be said of American social science.
Selznick, whom we are using as a sociologist who shares a somewhat
similar interpretation of the character of American social thought and who
67 Nisbet, supra note 59 at 229-3 1, argues that this shift is also made by Durkheim
himself insofar as his early work, The Division of Labour structures a frame of reference, whereas his later work which might be described as "intellectual craftsmanship",
addresses itself to the micro-level.
68R. Bendix, Bureaucracy: The Problem and its Setting (1947), 12 American
Sociological
Review 493-507.
69
Legal Culture, supra note 35.
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in that sense, is attempting to expand the parameters of that discipline,
describes his concern with the sociology of law in this way:
The larger context of our inquiry is the embodiment of ideals in institutions, me
infusion of group life with the aspirations and constraints of a moral order ... We
assume that to study the institutional embodiment of values we must look closely
at the values themselves, at the characteristic ways they are elaborated
and extend70
ed, and at the social circumstances that invite or resist them.

We have defined formal organizations as one of the fields in which a

collaboration between law as a body of knowledge and sociology as a body
of knowledge can be seen as one of the alternative solutions, or successful
responses, to the demands for change. Insofar as it is a successful response,
we would argue that it has attracted thinkers from both law and sociology
who share a similar orientation to the presently existing paradigm in American thought. They share a dissatisfaction with that paradigm and are
attempting to re-orient the view of reality it incorporates and to counteract
the a-historical bias by redirecting the mode of inquiry to a macro-level of
analysis which concerns itself with contemporary issues of a complex, modem industrial society. We find, for instance, a concern to understand the
process of development of legal systems which legitimate moral and rational
authority in the large modern industrial corporation. Furthermore, many
of these thinkers have re-written the history of organizational theory in an
attempt to demonstrate the degree to which organizational theory has been
influenced by socio-economic and historical conditions. The re-writing of
that history includes a "re-discovery" of Max Weber, as a symbolic intellectual culture-hero, and a concern to establish a synthesis of the early formalistic theory and the later micro-level human relations theory which
emphasized the informal and the irrational. Etzioni, for instance, defines this
new orientation as a "structuralist" stance and describes it as a synthesis of
previous schools of thought in organizational theory.71 This history is similar
to the one re-written by those of the school of thought which developed
around Herbert Simon in political science. The emphasis in the sociological
literature is on forms of control and legitimation, while the emphasis in
political science has been on decision-making as the key to understanding
modern organization.
It is important to recognize that there is a self-conscious, introspective
redirecting of the dominant paradign to take into account the formal and the
informal, the rational and the irrational. We submit that this process is structurally similar to Friedman's in Legal Cultureand Social Development. In one
sense, Friedman's study of ContractLaw in America can be seen as an excellent sociological history of the idea of the law of contract. Although he does
not formally conceptualize it in these terms, he has documented the changes
in the legal institutions which have occurred along with corresponding changes
in the economic system, thus describing the conditions under which "legal
realism" developed. Actual changes in the conception of law, or the philosophy of law, then, can be viewed as related to the changes in the legal
70P. Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1969) 3.
7lEtzioni, Modern Organization (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964); also, N. P.
Mouzellis, Organization and Bureaucracy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967)
especially at 55-66 and at 123-33
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institutions themselves. The perception of the role of the judicial institution
by the legal realist bears an important relationship to the effect that economic
and social changes have had on the judicial institution.
We would argue that, insofar as a new view of reality is emerging and
generating a successful collaboration between law and sociology, this view
of reality takes into account the important appreciation of the fact that institutions and ideas do indeed have histories, and do act as important forces
in structuring reality. This approach is significant in that one, it cuts across
disciplinary boundaries; two, it has more in common with the macro-level
approaches of both Durkheim and Weber and addresses itself to the issues
of modern industrial society as a complex social system undergoing rapid and
radical social change; three, .it involves an attempt to restructure the dominant paradigm; and four, it does this while employing a relativistic stance in
re-interpreting the history of bodies of knowledge. We would submit that
the type of research which is being conducted on the macro-level by the
symbolic interactionists (including Scheff) has a similar orientation and
attempts to operationalize small group and interpersonal interaction within a
similar macro-level context. In that sense, there does seem to be emerging
a new, non-functionalist paradigm which is not confined to one discipline,
but is being diffused across disciplines as an exploration of the implications
of phenomenology within the respective bodies of knowledge. Thus, it represents a demand for change in the form in which knowledge is institutionalized.
The problem of interdisciplinary communication, then, can be seen as a
response to the problems of intra-disciplinary communication. Life in the
refugee centre is more of an intermediary stage in which relativism is applied
to presently existing bodies of knowledge. This process, of attempting to
borrow information from other bodies of knowledge in order to demonstrate
the limited character of the established paradigm, can be seen as a process
in which new consensus is arrived at. A new view of reality that cuts across
disciplines begins to emerge and takes its form in one of the successful ways
of satisfying demands for change. For our purposes, the point to be made is
that much of the confusion and frustration within the refugee centre is a reflection of the attempt to realize or understand the degree to which a consensus about the need for change and the methodology required for those
changes exists across disciplines.
Relativism as a Way of UnderstandingCompeting
Schools of Thought Within Disciplines
We have employed an essentially relativistic stance to develop an appreciation of the importance of a shared view of reality or a consensus as to
ends and means of bodies of knowledge. We have emphasized how during
periods of rapid and radical social change, competing views of reality within
disciplines tend to take on a more "revolutionary" character, and how there
may be a greater affinity between revolutionaries of different disciplines than
within disciplines.
But how do competing schools of thought within disciplines develop and
how do they influence the development of intra-disciplinary conflict and
dissensus? Oswald Hall, has some interesting and relevant things to say about
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a phenomena noticed in the Chicago school of social science which marks
the founding of American social science. 2 Apparently there existed S men
(Similarities) and D men (differences), whose membership in either the S
camp or the D camp was often a more significant description of their intellectual interests and orientations than was the discipline to which they
belonged. It was observed that the tendency was for S men to be often either
totally bored with the D men, or to see them as hostile opponents in the
search for truth (and vice versa). This "trained incapacity" to see the
validity of a radically different view of reality is probably a corollary of
Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Some people
are looking for differences, others for similarities; some are attempting to tear
down an old system, some attempting to establish a new one. The trick, and
we assume that this follows from what has been said about the restructuring
and re-writing of the history of one's discipline, is that in a very important
sense, these different sensibilities are patterned, or, perhaps, can be analytically patterned to show different stages in the development of both individual
intellectual histories and intellectual histories of bodies of thought.
The difficulty in taking account of history is that, because it happened
so long ago, there is a tendency to see it in one of two ways, depending on
how it is being used for particular purposes. For instance, sometimes we run
the risk of conceptualizing the industrial revolution as happening one Thursday in May, in England. At other times, we run the opposite risk of
accounting for everything as the result of some technological revolution that
is left undated so that it can be used as an explanation of all things. In the
same way, we tend to think of bodies of knowledge as having somehow
dropped from the skies one day, without ever involving struggles between
different conceptions of what that body of knowledge ought to be doing, or
how it ought to be verifying its explanations and predictions. We also sometimes take the opposite stance that bodies of knowledge are always changing
at some nice, calm, constant rate, and that what is going on now is no different from the kind of intellectual conflict that has always gone on within
disciplines. As Kuhn points out, during periods of normal science, this
way of conceptualizing the intellectual enterprise is not only adequate, but
necessary to the development of bodies of knowledge. However, during revolutionary or crisis stages, disciplines are marked by a breakdown in communication between different sensibilities which can be seen as a crucial part
of the development of rival alternatives for the status of "new paradigm"
and the normal science view of intellectual development is not, in this crisis
stage, an adequate description of intellectual development.
Thus, the distinctions between similarities and differences, universals
and particulars, structure and content, etc., are important when one is
attempting to relate to the intellectual endeavour. These distinctions serve
72From a seminar in Occupations and Profession, Dept. of Sociology, University
of Toronto, 1969. Discussions of different orientations often go back to J. S. Mill

On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, and his discussion of the possibilities for scientific
bodies of thought dealing with social behaviour. See, for instance, John Madge, The
Tools of Social Science (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1965) especially
52-74. See also, Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1964) for a discussion of "reconstructed logic", and the problems of defining
and describing a "scientific method", especially 3-12 and 29-33.
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as a reminder that a concern for establishing universals, or a concern to
establish the outer limits of new intellectual parameters, be interpreted
alternatively as a "quest for reality", a rage for order, a propensity for mental
closure, or a quest for certainty, depending on the terminology that is appropriate to different disciplines, and depending upon one's vantage point for
viewing these distinctions. However, we argue that these differences are
best understood as stages of development of bodies of thought. The distinction between normal and crisis, or revolutionary science, is then, crucial to
an understanding of the different sensibilities which define the tone of these
stages. This position does not imply that an S man is always an S man, or
that a D man is always a D man; but rather that when one is uncomfortable
within the parameters around the intellectual questions which he perceives
to be crucial, he will often attempt to change them. This may involve a
revolutionary attack on those parameters, as he may become engaged in
tearing down the old paradigm as a way of building the new.
We have argued that the enterprise of tearing down an old paradigm
is of a different character than that of building a new one, although, from
a more detached point of view, these processes are dialectically related on a
more abstract level of generality. In this way, we can see relativism as both
an ideological tool and an essential feature of the utopion vision of interdisciplinary communication.
The Great Debates: Hart-Fuller,The Value-Free Debate, and
The End of Ideology Debate
We have argued that there is a view of reality which characterizes much
of American thought, and which has been the source of varying degrees of
dissatisfaction in many of the disciplines. One of the characteristics of interdisciplinary communication is that it is seen as a solution to dissatisfaction
within disciplines. However, we have tried to show that interdisciplinary
attempts often serve to emphasize the extent to which the original problems
exist and tend to intensify demands for change. If there is a world view
shared across disciplines, can we locate indicators of minor revolutions,
dissensus and polarizations in the recent history of law and sociology which
resemble each other? Have the dominant paradigms of these disciplines
been accused recently of "technical breakdown" or an inability to deal
with problems that have emerged with the emergence of new perceptions of
reality?
The Hart-Fuller debate in law in the late 1950's can be seen as structurally similar to the value-free debate in the social sciences during the same
period. 73 The value-free debate can be seen as the initial rumblings of discontent in sociology and marks the beginning of a highly introspective period
during which many sociologists have made excursions into the realm of
philosophy of science, methodology, meta-theory and epistemology.74
73 H. L A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, and Lon
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart (1958), 71 Harvard
Law Review at 593-629, 630-672.
74
See, for instance, a recent comment on this period in T. Bottomore, Has Sociology a Future (March 11, 1971), 16 N.Y. Rev. of Books.
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Sociology on Trial, published in honor of C.W. Mills, is a collection of
essays which document the identity crisis of Sociology, and many of these
essays deal specifically with the possibility and the implications of a valuefree sociology.78i The degree of dissensus and polarization that existed in
the 1950's and 1960's has become even more intense, and the question of
"how do we know what we know" has become of increasing concern.
The value-free debate is often associated with the name of C.W. Mills,
and the New Sociology movement which developed around it tended to see
Mills as a founding father figure. The debate involved a discussion over the
degree to which it was possible, as the functional sociologists claimed, to
have a science of society that was free of the value judgments of the sociologists. The argument generally was advanced that what went under the name
of value free was really an apology for the status quo. Mills saw himself as
very much in the tradition of European sociology as opposed to American
sociology, and much of his early writings in particular draw on a "sociology
of knowledge" tradition that includes Marx, Weber, Mannheim, and is
addressed to "macro-level" philosophical and theoretical questions. 76 The
Sociological Imagination includes a serious indictment against 77American
sociology under the influence of Talcott Parsons as grand theorist.
Many of the social thinkers who had been actively involved in the
functional debate of the 1950's found themselves similarly aligned in the
value-free debate, and also taking sides in the End of Ideology debate even
though the latter tended to be more important for political scientists than
for sociologists. The end of ideology debate was triggered by Daniel Bell, a
former leftist who had reached a personal and intellectual peace with liberal
thought in America and felt that it was now possible to go about building a
scientific social science above value bias and ideology.7 8 It was, of course,
an argument structurally similar to the value-free debate and immediately
attacked by those who had not reached a similar level of satisfaction with the
character of American social sciences. The End of Ideology Debate"9 , recently published, is an important documentation of the degree to which
ideology can not be so easily put to rest.
In these debates, it seems safe to say that relativism was used as an
ideological weapon by the "malcontents". The excursion into methodology,
meta-theory and the philosophy of science equipped these young radical
intellectuals with the proof which they deemed sufficient to attack the
functionalist paradigm. Essential to this debate was the attack on the
a-historicism of the dominant school and its failure to predict the intensity
of conflict that disrupted the American cities and the black ghettoes. It was
in history that the radicals found proof of the degree to which all dominant
ideas have been influenced by ideological interests which develop from
75
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See, for instance, the collection of essays in, C. W. Mills, Power, Politics and
People (ed.) Horowitz, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) especially Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge, 453-469.
77 C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press, 1959).
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1Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1960).
70 Waxman Chain (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Waxman
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particular socio-economic and historical contexts. The psychology of perception also provided these radicals with "scientific proof" that perceptions
of reality are influenced by personal, subjective and ideological factors, and
that these perceptions continue to influence concept formulation, methodology and theory building.
The Hart-Fuller debate involves many of the same issues, although it
was characterized by an elegance that the sociological debates lacked. This
could well be the bias of an outsider unaware of the tone of the discussion
outside the printed page. But one might speculate that it could also indicate
some very important differences in the intensity of the debate and the willingness of law to respond to change. Law, of course, has not shared the obsession with the status of "scientist" which has influenced the social sciences.
This could account for the difference in tone and style and might indicate
that "relativism" did not tend to become an important issue at that time.
In the Hart-Fuller debate, Fuller seems to represent the position that is
structurally similar to that used by the radical social scientists in their attack
on functionalism and its value-free pretensions. Taking seriously Selznick's
argument that 'Sociology can contribute most to law by tending its own
garden', rather than employing an in-depth legal analysis of that debate, we
shall refer only to the essential features of it that seem structurally similar
to the debates in the social sciences referred to above. 80 Fuller's position
then represents an emphasis on the degree to which all systems of thought
have incorporated within them ethical values and theoretical explanations
of reality consistent with those ethical values. Fuller, especially in Legal
Fictions l , draws on a tradition of German scholarship that was vital to the
radical sociologists referred to above and which takes very seriously the
role of myth and metaphor in language and in intellectual discourse.
My knowledge of the history of the philosophy of law in America is
too limited to suggest that the "relativism" inherent in Fuller's position came
to be used as an ideological weapon to the same extent that this occurred in
Sociology in the same period. Certainly the structure of the debate was
similar, and the questions which were addressed did focus on the metatheoretical level of inquiry, expressing a concern with the issue of whether
or not it was possible to separate the intellectual-legal from the ethical order.
Another important similarity is that Fuller and many of the radical social
scientists have drawn on writers who have explored the implications of
relativism in various fields. Fuller, for instance, refers to Nels Bohr and
Eddington in their discussion of the implications of the "new science" for
intellectual discourse.8 2 This reference is to the revolutionary breakthroughs
in physics that are connected with the work of Einstein and Heisenberg, that
is, Einstein's theory of relativity and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The
uncertainty principle in particular has been used as "proof" that, even in
natural science, there is an interaction between knower and known. Heisen8
8

0i.e., the value-free and end of ideology debates.
l Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
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berg, himself, has often been quoted as remarking that, "The mathematical
formulae no longer portray nature, but rather our knowledge of nature." 88
Insofar as Fuller shares an appreciation of the "structure" of language
and of myth and metaphor as important features of what comes to be known
as rational and/or scientific thought, he represents a sensibility that cuts
across disciplines and is a crucial factor in the movement for change in the
form in which knowledge is institutionalized. To that extent, his work is of
the character that can be used as an ideological weapon against a view of
reality which does not concern itself with the dynamics of the interplay between knowledge and values, ideas and institutions, or how it is possible to
establish a view of reality and a form of institutionalizing knowledge that
incorporates these dynamic processes in history.
Finally, there are a few points made by Cowan in What Law Can do
For Social Science, which I think are immediately relevant.8 4 This paper has
tried to communicate a perspective which allows us to see collaboration
between law and sociology within the broader context of intellectuals' responses to major, not yet understood, structural changes in society. It has
tried to emphasize that there is a unique character to the ways in which bodies
of knowledge have been institutionalized, and that this character has been
influenced by numerous super-rational forces which we do not fully understand. Cowan's article is a unique appreciation of this perspective. He
stresses the degree to which law has a different form of proof than the natural
and social sciences and that it incorporates ideas of values and ethics. Modem
science, on the other hand, has grown from a tradition that attempted to
"bracket off" questions of ethics and values. Therefore, the history of modern
science can be seen as the history of a particular form of institutionalizing
intellectual inquiry which separates questions of truth from questions of fact,
and relegates them to non-scientific bodies of thought. Many contemporary
intellectuals are re-questioning this separation, as they did when atomic
warfare first became a reality of modern life and an expression of that separation. Cowan, then, is addressing the important point .which is often forgotten, that modern science represents a particular form of institutionalizing
an intellectual discipline which is not necessarily the only form possible.
This explains the view taken by Warren Weaver, a natural scientist who
reminds us that science is not interested in questions of value and ethics. It
is not interested in "truth" and, in fact, not concerned with explanation either.
Rather it concerns itself with "generality, elegance, control and prediction". 85
In a similar argument, Cowan points out indirectly the effect of a particular
form of the institutionalization of science by comparing earlier concerns that
were incorporated into questions of science. Law, he argues, is interested in
truth in a way more similar to the way that medieval, or classical, science
was, and in a way that modern science is not.
Today, when "scientism" has taken on the characteristics of a religion,
this point is relevant. Cowan also makes another point that is often forgotten;
83 Id.
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One hears it said frequently today that without science, modem life would not
be possible. This is, of course, true, since without modem science our lives would
is
not be "modem". But that modem civilization or indeed, any civilization at all,
quite impossible without law is a truism that seldom needs even be stated. 80

The idea that modem science has been institutionalized in a particular
way that was greatly influenced by the historical struggle between a sacred
and a secular definition of reality is brought out in Cowan's reminder that
scientific thought is no longer concerned with whether or not the "stick in
the water is truly bent". Obviously, this separation between questions of
truth and questions that allow for control and change has had certain advantages for modern industrial society. However, a contemporary intellectual issue
is whether or not those advantages have been worthwhile and should be
perpetuated.
This idea, that forms of institutionalizing science and, in fact, institutionalizing ways of separating the ethical and non-ethical spheres of inquiry
is fascinating, but is definitely beyond the scope of most presently existing
bodies of thought. Yet, it is often this kind of question that interests those
who are attempting to restructure the current bodies of thought. These
questions, then, are being defined as relevant by many young intellectuals,
at least in part because they are not satisfied with the arrangements that
presently exist. New problems of economic development, international law,
pollution of basic resources, racial and ethnic injustices, etc., etc., all contribute to the feeling that the intellectual machinery for addressing these
problems is not adequate. These questions are certainly of the order, and
not unrelated to, the question that Friedman poses when he talks about legal
culture and social and economic development. In that sense, the refugee
centre is an expression of a dominant sentiment in contemporary society.

86 Supra note 16 at 92.

